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• Belarus is concerned by Russian actions in Ukraine 
and is trying to distance itself from Russia, including 
by not recognising the annexation of Crimea and 
calling for a peacekeeping mission. It is also suffering 
the effects of Russia’s economic downturn.• President Lukashenka has taken steps to promote 
the Belarusian language and identity to counter 
Russian influence. But he is not moving towards 
greater engagement with the political opposition.• The Ukraine crisis has reinforced the risk-averse 
instincts of the Belarusian people and reduced the 
likelihood of protests tied to elections scheduled 
for this year.• Minsk is not likely to shift from its broadly pro-
Russian orientation, but it has made tentative 
diplomatic overtures to the EU.• The EU’s pro-democracy sanctions policy toward 
Belarus has failed to promote political reform and 
arguably pushed Belarus closer to Russia. Now the 
EU has to focus not just on fostering democracy but 
on strengthening Belarusian society, which will help 
European interests in the long term.• The EU should aim to help Belarus with a modernised 
form of nation building, engaging with civil society, 
offering assistance on economic reform, lowering 
the visa barrier, promoting knowledge of the EU and 
countering Russian propaganda.
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Belarus is returning to the international spotlight, but for 
once, not just as the “last dictatorship in Europe”. The two 
summits that Minsk hosted in the past year on the conflict in 
east Ukraine indicate a tentative shift in Belarus’s political 
alignment. Although Belarus was more of a broker than a 
genuine neutral party at the negotiations that produced the 
two “Minsk Agreements”, the government has profound 
doubts about Russia’s assault on its neighbour’s sovereignty. 
Minsk has responded by taking steps to distance itself 
from its dominant patron. Belarus has not recognised the 
annexation of Crimea and has called for an international 
peacekeeping mission to Ukraine, which would include 
Belarusian troops. It has even called for the United States to 
play a role in efforts to end the crisis. 
Moreover, Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia is 
proving problematic: blowback from the Russian recession 
and falling oil prices have hit Belarus hard in what is scheduled 
to be an election year. However, Belarus has secured a high 
price, including $3 billion in loans, for continuing to go along 
with Vladimir Putin’s pet Eurasian Union project, launched 
on 1 January 2015. The adjustment in Belarus’s political 
positioning provides the European Union with a chance to 
rethink its relationship with the country, after a period in 
which the EU’s hard-line approach has achieved few results, 
and at a time when the Ukraine crisis is prompting the EU to 
reassess its policy towards its eastern neighbours.
Unlike in Azerbaijan, where the regime has exploited the 
Ukraine crisis to crack down on opposition, the Belarusian 
authorities have sought to build bridges and broaden their 
support. They have not tried to engage with the political 
opposition, which remains weak and divided and is still 
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likely to be harassed at election time. But they have taken 
cautious steps to promote the Belarusian language and 
identity. The country’s long-time president, Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka, has stated: 
Those who think that the Belarusian land is part 
as what they call the Russian world, almost part of 
Russia, should forget about it! Belarus is a modern and 
independent state.1
Having come to power as the scourge of traditional 
Belarusian nationalists, Lukashenka has previously relied 
on a vague sense of civic – but Russian-speaking – national 
identity. Now, he seems to feel that his regime’s long-term 
survival must be built on something more solid. 
These modest measures to strengthen Belarusian identity 
have increased tensions with Russia. Some of Russia’s wilder 
nationalist fringes have even officially shifted Lukashenka 
from the camp of “friend” to “foe”. Belarusian authorities 
have started to make tentative diplomatic overtures to 
the EU.2 Outreach of this kind has not been seen since 
Lukashenka began a brief period of engagement during a 
previous round of Russian pressure and economic troubles 
in 2009-2010. In that instance, the president sabotaged 
the effort by resorting to mass arrests after the fraudulent 
election in December 2010.
The EU faces a difficult dilemma of its own. On the one hand, 
it does not want to be seen to embrace a leader who is still, in 
the end, a dictator. On the other hand, after Russia’s invasion 
of Ukraine, a case can be made for supporting all of Russia’s 
embattled neighbours, both friend and foe, as politics is 
turned upside down across the region. And Belarus could 
be part of the solution to the Russia problem, if engagement 
with the new Eurasian Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Armenia) proves easier than engaging Russia alone, or if 
the West can strengthen Russia’s partners as a counterweight 
against an increasingly assertive Russia. A more isolated 
Belarus, however, could become completely ensnared by 
Russia, whether or not Lukashenka remains in power. 
The EU has tried almost every possible approach with 
Belarus since President Lukashenka was first elected in 1994. 
Relations were first put on hold after his unconstitutional 
consolidation of power in 1996. The enforced disappearance 
of several of his key opponents in 1999-2000 led to a first 
round of EU sanctions in 2004, which Europe followed with 
attempts to support the opposition and civil society. After 
the failure of the brief period of regime engagement in 
2009-2010, the EU imposed new rounds of sanctions. 
The last period of engagement between the West and 
Belarus in 2009-2010 was different from the present one, 
in that at that time, the Belarusian administration also 
took some limited steps towards domestic liberalisation. 
The EU thought it could use engagement to encourage this 
liberalisation. The EU did little wrong, but Lukashenka put 
1   “Belarusian Leader Issues Tough Warning to Moscow”, New York Times, 29 January 
2015, available at http://nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/29/world/europe/ap-eu-
belarus-lukashenko.html.
2   Igar Gubarevich, “Belarus Engages With The US, Improves Ties With Europe And 
Post-Soviet Countries – Foreign Policy Digest”, 2 April 2015, Belarus Digest, available 
at http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-engages-us-improves-ties-europe-and-post-
soviet-countries-%E2%80%93-foreign-policy-digest-2218.
an end to the policy, fearing a domestic challenge to his rule. 
This time, Lukashenka is seeking a more limited engagement 
with the EU because of the external threat from Russia, 
and because he is worried that disorder and demands for 
democratisation could spread from Ukraine. Ironically, this 
may mean that on this occasion, his foreign policy overtures 
to the West have a stronger domestic foundation. But the 
West must decide whether it wants to take up the offer that is 
being made – of helping to strengthen Belarusian statehood 
rather than supporting domestic demands for reform. 
The great survivor
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West had high 
expectations for Belarus and other countries in the region. 
Western capitals thought that it would be natural that 
Belarusians should take the route to democracy and European 
integration. However, European policymakers failed to take 
into account the fact that Belarus, although geographically 
unquestionably European, was psychologically one of the most 
Soviet of the Soviet Republics. They underestimated the effect 
of decades of propaganda and Soviet repression against feeble 
Belarusian national elites.3 Lukashenka came to power in 1994 
through exploiting populism and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. 
Given its weak sense of national and civic identity, many 
in the 1990s questioned the Belarusian state’s potential for 
longevity. But paradoxically, Lukashenka’s consolidation 
of power not only created a stronger state, at least in the 
security sector, but even made his Belarus a role model for 
conservatives in Russia and throughout the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), which opened up lucrative 
opportunities for foreign policy “balancing” (see below). 
Over the last 20 years, Lukashenka has been dismantling 
meaningful democratic institutions, particularly parliament 
and the courts, which now merely rubber-stamp decisions 
taken by the executive. The executive branch with the 
president at the top completely controls the legislature 
and judiciary, and the rule of law remains weak. Western 
countries routinely and rightly assess Belarusian elections 
as neither fair nor free. The regime has been accused of 
a series of human rights violations against civil society, 
journalists, and political opponents.
In 2004, Lukashenka called Belarus a “crystal vessel” that he 
had to carry with care and veneration; he was afraid to drop it 
because it was so fragile and vulnerable.4 However, the truth is 
that his own paternalistic treatment has left the political system 
of Belarus highly personalised, with elements of strength (the 
security state and the “social contract” – see below) coexisting 
with elements of weakness (openness to Russian influence and 
the instrumental nature of that “social contract”). 
Back in the early 2000s Lukashenka’s main preoccupation 
was the Belarusian opposition. But almost two decades of 
pressure and intimidation have rendered the opposition 
unable to seriously confront the authorities. Many activists 
3   Andrew Wilson, Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2011).
4   Alyaksandr Lukashenka, “Address of the President of the Republic of Belarus to the 
Belarusian People” (“Обращение Президента Республики Беларуси Александра 
Лукашенко к белорусскому народу”), Vecherni Minsk, 9 September 2004, available at 
http://vminsk.by/news/22/32216.
3have been pushed out of politics or into exile. In fact, 
Belarus remains a society largely without politics, even at 
the elite level. 
The Belarusian opposition, although it is made up of brave 
and committed people, can reach only a very limited number 
of Belarusians, especially since many of its leaders and 
activists now operate from abroad. As one observer put it: 
“the West has placed too many expectations on the shoulders 
of the small opposition for too long”5. Unlike in Ukraine, 
the opposition is nearly completely cut off from decision-
making in the country and from the state-controlled media, 
which remain the main source of information for majority 
of people. Very few people, therefore, either know much 
about the opposition and its problems or support it.6 
Under Lukashenka, Belarus has avoided the kind of extreme 
social inequality that has arisen in Russia and Ukraine over 
the past 25 years. Moreover, it has escaped involvement 
in foreign wars. As of 2014, Belarus could suddenly claim 
to be the only Eastern Partnership country with no frozen 
territorial disputes. Most of the economy is still state-owned, 
and, to date, Belarus has avoided creating the same kind of 
rent-seeking oligarchy as in Russia and Ukraine, although 
the administration has shown an increasing tendency to 
“spread the wealth” amongst the bureaucratic elite in order 
to head off their demands for insider privatisation. 
A Belarusian “social contract” has created a genuine, 
opportunistic, base of support for the regime. Nevertheless, 
Lukashenka’s rule has had mixed results for ordinary 
Belarusians. The World Bank has placed Belarus 
reasonably high in its Doing Business reports.7 Even 
so, many investors prefer to avoid the country because 
of the unpredictable nature of the legal-administrative 
environment.8 Russian subsidies (see below) have largely 
been spent on maintaining the public sector, although 
an unknown amount disappears into the presidential 
administration. Belarus has developed a reputation for 
bureaucratic competence in many areas. International 
rankings put corruption levels lower, and the prosperity 
and human development index higher, than in Russia or 
Ukraine.9 
On the other hand, Belarus’s economy is inefficient and only 
maintained by state subsidies. Foreign exchange reserves 
are always low (currently at $4.7 billion), and Lukashenka 
must constantly find top-up funds to keep the economy 
going. His system of largesse leads to regular crises of over-
5   Balázs Jarábik, “Revisiting Belarus: The Reality Beyond the Rhetoric”, Carnegie 
Europe, 3 December 2014, available at available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/
publications/?fa=57373.
6   Belarusians are becoming increasingly sceptical about the authorities, but this has not 
translated into support for the opposition. According to one recent poll, only 16 percent 
of people trust political parties and 60 percent do not trust them. None of the opposition 
leaders has the support of more than 4 percent of the population. See “The Most 
Important Results of the Public Opinion Poll in December 2014”, Independent Institute 
of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, 2 January 2015, available at http://www.iiseps.
org/reliz/30/lang/en. 
7   Belarus is ranked 57th, ahead of Russia (62nd) and Ukraine (96th) but below Poland 
(32nd) and Lithuania (24th). Doing Business 2015, World Bank, available at www.
doingbusiness.org/rankings.
8   See Kari Liuhto, “Experiences of Finnish firms operating in Belarus – Balancing between 
profits and political peculiarities”, The Pan-European Institute, April 2014, available at 
www.utu.fi/en/units/tse/units/PEI/reports/Documents/Liuhto%204_2014.pdf.
9   Ryhor Astapenia, “Belarus In World Rankings: Strong Potential, Weak Performance”, 
Belarus Digest, 16 July 2014, available at http://belarusdigest.com/papers/
ehuforbelarus.pdf.
consumption, inflation, and devaluation – particularly 
because he always spends heavily in advance of elections, as 
though they represented a real competition.
Lukashenka’s version of the game of balance
Most of the money that maintains Belarus’s paternalist 
social contract and bureaucratic apparatus comes from 
Russia. Lukashenka devised a strategy to retain his hold 
on power and secure financing not by balancing equally 
between East and West, but by remaining in the Russian 
camp and appearing anti-Western so as to play to Russia’s 
imperial urge, while still engaging in regular disruptive 
behaviour towards Russia. 
Lukashenka sometimes likes to talk of Belarusian foreign 
policy as being “two-winged”. But the metaphor has more to 
do with Belarus’s independent flight than with maintaining 
equidistance between two opposing parties. Belarusians 
have a widely promoted reputation as being naturally pro-
Russian, but survival comes before geopolitical orientation 
– and Lukashenka’s survival and the maintenance of his type 
of regime are assumed to be the same thing. Opinion polls 
asking whether Belarusians support closer relations with 
the EU or with Russia vary as to which alternative is on top 
at any given moment, but in general, the two options are 
roughly equal. Belarusians do not want to choose between 
the two: they want to use one to get the other. 
The Belarusian authorities have become quite skilled at 
the balancing game. Unlike Western countries, Russia has 
no interest in imposing democracy and market reforms on 
the Belarusian regime. 10 It has made occasional threats 
to support the Belarusian opposition or undermine 
Lukashenka’s nearly unlimited authority in Belarus, but it 
has never seriously attempted to follow through on these 
threats. As Lukashenka has admitted, no other potential 
partner can match the support that Russia offers:
No one will replace Russia for us. And when we 
are in dialogue with the West, with the EU, with 
America, with others, we ask [only] one question, 
and I talk about this openly – will you replace 
Russia for us? No. Then why did you have to pull 
us on this? 11
Security calculations are another reason that Belarus 
embraces Russia-sponsored initiatives, from the CIS to 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). After the colour 
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-2004, the 
Belarusian ruler for a long time saw internal unrest as the 
most likely threat to his rule. Belarus occasionally flirted 
with the West, for example by joining the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership and by interacting closely with top European 
politicians before the 2010 elections. But the Belarusian 
leadership consciously chose to prioritise the Russian vector. 
10   For example, the EU would like Belarus to conform to the EU Strategic Framework 
on Human Rights and Democracy of 2012. See “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan 
on Human Rights and Democracy”, European Council, 25 June 2012, available at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf.
11   “President: No one will replace Russia for us” (“Президент: Россию нам никто не 
заменит”), Tut.by, 15 January 2015, available at http://m.tut.by/news/politics/431512.html.
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The Belarusian authorities, with their mercantilist trading 
mentality, also feel that the West has given them scant 
reward for their occasional but risky defiance of Russia. 
They think that the West has failed to appreciate Belarus’s 
role in facilitating the transit of supplies for the US-led 
mission in Afghanistan, as well as the country’s active 
cooperation on the illicit transit of nuclear substances.12 
Belarus has contributed to the security of the EU’s eastern 
border, reducing the flow of arms, drugs, and immigrants 
coming through its territory to the EU. Moreover, Belarus 
maintains good relations with Ukraine and did not recognise 
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after 2008, 
even though Russia put pressure on it to do so. 
The EU and Belarusian officials conduct very little 
meaningful interaction, and the Belarusian opposition has 
traditionally been preoccupied with human rights issues. 
Therefore, nearly all other potential areas for cooperation 
between the EU and Belarus, such as education and the 
economy, have been marginalised. That has created very 
favourable conditions for Russia to expand its influence on 
the Belarusian economy, cultural sphere, security sector, 
and mass media. Until recently, Lukashenka was happy with 
that situation. It was he who closed off the last opportunity 
for rapprochement with the West in 2010, calculating that 
a closer embrace of Russia was a lesser evil than allowing 
the pluralism for which the West was pressing. But that 
calculation has now begun to change. 
Eurasian integration: form over substance
For nearly two decades, Lukashenka has been successfully 
selling to Russia the image and the partial reality that 
Belarus is its only reliable foreign ally. Not surprisingly, 
Lukashenka remains the most trusted foreign leader in 
Russia: in December 2014 two-thirds of Russians said that 
Belarus was Russia’s most reliable partner and regarded 
Belarus as the most successful CIS country.13 As long as 
Russia was kept afloat by high oil prices, it was happy to 
pay to maintain this image, providing massive subsidies to 
the Belarusian economy in the form of cheap oil and gas 
– worth up to 15 percent of Belarusian GDP.14 In exchange, 
the Belarusian authorities supported nearly all of Russia’s 
initiatives in the international arena and used the same 
anti-Western rhetoric as Russia, both at home and abroad 
– in fact, they would claim to have come up with many of its 
key elements, such as Slavic solidarity and the dangers of a 
US-led unipolar world.
The Belarusian leadership may sometimes appear undecided 
on the choice between the EU and Russia, but in reality, it 
simply has no choice. Belarus’s geopolitical loyalty is its 
main asset, and it has been successfully exchanging this 
12   Vladimir Socor, “Lukashenka Holds Dialogue in Minsk with US Analysts (Part Two)”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 December 2010, available at http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37297&no_cache=1.
13   “VTsIOM: Russians trust Lukashenka and consider Belarus the most friendly and 
successful country in the CIS” (“ВЦИОМ: Россияне доверяют Лукашенко и считают 
Беларусь самой дружественной и успешной страной СНГ”), Tut.by, 16 December 
2014, available at http://news.tut.by/politics/428143.html.
14   “Republic of Belarus: 2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Press Release 
and Statement by the Executive Director for the Republic of Belarus”. International 
Monetary Fund Country Report 14/226, July 2014, available at https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14226.pdf (hereafter, IMF, “Republic of Belarus”).
loyalty for Russian subsidies. This means that, ironically, 
Lukashenka’s model of survival depends on the credibility 
of his image as being “the last dictator in Europe”, an image 
for which Russia is willing to pay. Therefore, in fact, being 
the regional outcast suits Belarus. Not surprisingly, it is the 
only country in the region that is a member neither of the 
World Trade Organization nor of the Council of Europe. It 
still uses capital punishment and it keeps its universities 
outside of the pan-European Bologna education framework. 
Belarus consistently participates in international 
organisations led by Russia and tries to stay away from 
Europe-led initiatives. It has signed up to the CIS, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the bipartite Union 
State of Russia and Belarus, the tripartite Customs Union 
of the Common Economic Space, and now the EEU, which 
was officially launched on 1 January 2015. But Lukashenka 
is very good at leveraging Belarus’s participation in and 
occasional criticism of such projects to extract more 
subsidies from Russia – such as the $3 billion in loans that 
he obtained earlier this year for continuing to go along with 
the EEU. The West should not mistake this kind of criticism 
for real existential objection. For example, at the December 
2014 meeting of EEU heads of state, Lukashenka surprised 
Putin by saying that in fact there was no free movement of 
goods between EEU members. He said that the Eurasian 
Commission had failed to engage in resolving any serious 
controversies, referring, in particular, to Russia’s recent ban 
on imports of Belarusian produce. Lukashenka also observed 
that the level of mutual trade between EEU members had 
declined by more than 10 percent over the preceding year.15 
Indeed, EEU rules exempt around 600 types of goods and 
services from the regulations on free movement.16 Most 
importantly, no energy union has been agreed. Instead of 
giving EEU member states unrestricted access to products 
such as oil and gas, Russia prefers to preserve the right 
to continuously renegotiate terms in order to achieve its 
political objectives. Minsk is disappointed that an EEU 
agreement on petrochemicals (a vital part of Belarus’s 
trade) has been put off until 2025. 
Russia would like the EU to treat the EEU more seriously, 
but so far, there is little evidence that the institution 
will play any role independent from Russia. Although 
the “Eurasian Union” sounds like the “European Union”, 
the EEU essentially represents an unequal alliance of 
authoritarian leaders who do not wish to transfer any 
serious political decision-making powers to supranational 
bodies. Despite all the rhetoric about integration, the 
Belarusian authorities have consistently rejected Russian 
proposals to transfer aspects of their country’s sovereignty 
to supranational institutions. Kazakhstan has repeatedly 
emphasised that it does not view the EEU as a political 
body. Moreover, the EEU still has to prove its viability 
15   Lukashenka stated that in January-September 2014, the volume of trade of the future 
members of the Eurasian Economic Union amounted to only 89.5 percent of the total in 
the same period in 2013. See “Working visit to the Russian Federation”, Official Internet 
Portal of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 23 December 2014, available at http://
president.gov.by/en/news_en/view/working-visit-to-the-russian-federation-10525/.
16   See Yauheni Preiherman, “Ukraine Can Help Belarus with Exemptions in 
the Eurasian Economic Union’” Belarus Digest, 8 April 2014, available at http://
belarusdigest.com/story/ukraine-can-help-belarus-exemptions-eurasian-economic-
union-17393.
5in the context of low oil prices, which could undermine 
Russia’s integration initiatives. 
It is noteworthy that many of Russia’s previous integration 
initiatives still only exist on paper. For example, the 
Economic Court of the CIS has failed to play any significant 
role in resolving disagreements between member states 
on the basis of law. The Court of the Eurasian Economic 
Community, which formally started functioning in 2012, 
is a similar body, which is supposed to be in charge of 
economic disputes. But in post-Soviet countries that have 
serious domestic problems with the rule of law and judicial 
independence, any international court is likely to play a very 
modest role. 
Equally, it seems unrealistic that an EU-like organisation can 
function between giant Russia and its small authoritarian 
neighbours, which have been lured into the arrangement 
with generous economic subsidies. The original impetus for 
the creation of the forerunners of the EU was a widespread 
desire for post-war reconciliation. The EEU, by contrast, 
is primarily a coalition of authoritarian regimes, mainly 
interested in political survival and with little concern for 
human rights. 
The effects of the crisis in Ukraine 
After the events in Crimea and the Donbas, Lukashenka has 
been forced to think about ways to protect Belarus from a 
more assertive Russia. The Belarusian authorities now realise 
that the Belarusian economy, military, media, and cultural 
identity have become too intertwined with Russia. Russian 
media dominates the media landscape, the Belarusian 
language has been virtually removed from public use, and the 
public’s sense of national and civil identity is weak. This could 
make Belarus particularly vulnerable to potential influence, 
subversion, or even intervention from the east. 
“Little green men” might be unlikely to operate effectively 
against Belarus’s hard security state. However, in January 2015, 
Belarus amended its legislation to say that any appearance 
of armed foreign forces on Belarusian territory would be 
considered an act of aggression, regardless of whether 
they were sent as regular forces or not. Belarus’s greatest 
vulnerability is in the information sphere. Russian TV channels 
remain much more popular than their more modestly funded 
Belarusian equivalents. According to unofficial private figures, 
of those watching television, over 65 percent of Belarusians 
use Russian state TV as their main source of news and only 35 
percent rely on Belarusian state TV.
Lukashenka has moved to respond to these vulnerabilities 
by trying to reinforce Belarusian national identity. In 
January 2015, it was announced that school classes on 
geography and on the history of Belarus would be taught 
in Belarusian (though the timetable for implementation 
was left unclear). Government websites are now supposed 
to provide a Belarusian version. The Belarusian authorities 
have grown more tolerant of grassroots campaigning by 
NGOs promoting the Belarusian language.17 Also in January, 
Lukashenka stated that “culture makes Belarusians 
Belarusians rather than just ‘locals’, wherever they are”, and 
“includes the language we must know, the history we must 
remember, and the values we must respect”.18 
The crisis in Ukraine has also strengthened the risk-averse 
attitude of Belarus’s people. Lukashenka has throughout 
his leadership reflected this aspect of the character of 
Belarusians, most of whom want to avoid revolution or war 
at any cost. As the Belarusian proverb goes, “as long as there 
is no war”, it is not so bad. A large number of Belarusians 
genuinely support Lukashenka as a defender of the status 
quo. Belarusians still remember the Second World War, 
which reduced the population of Belarus by a quarter and 
left the country in ruins – and the memory is carefully 
cultivated by the authorities for their own purposes.19  
Unsurprisingly, given its broad exposure to aggressive 
Russian propaganda, the majority of the population also 
17   Siarhei Bohdan, “Belarusian Government Angers Russian Nationalists”, Belarus 
Digest, 29 January 2015, available at http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-
government-angers-russian-nationalists-21181.
18   “Belarusian history and geography will be taught in the Belarusian language” 
(“Историю Беларуси и географию будут преподавать на белорусском языке”), Tut.
by, 21 January 2015, available at http://news.tut.by/society/432381.html.
19   “David Marples: The Nation Built On The World War II Myth”, Belarus Digest, 14 
June 2012, available at http://belarusdigest.com/story/david-marples-nation-built-
world-war-ii-myth-9701.
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14.9
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12.7
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-4.6
6.6
10.9
Total support
Energy Support from Russia, 2012-2013
(in percent of GDP)
Implied subsidy on oil imports
Transfer to the Russian budget of the export duty on oil products
Discounted oil product exports to Russia
Implied subsidy on gas imports
Figure 1: Energy Support from Russia, 2012-2013
Source: IMF Country Report No. 14/226, July 2014.
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takes a pro-Russian position on the Ukraine conflict. 
Some estimations say that over 50 percent of Belarusians 
considered Russia’s annexation of Crimea justified.20 
Without a clear national or civil identity and with limited 
access to independent media, it is easy to manipulate public 
opinion in Belarus – both for Lukashenka and for Russia. 
Moreover, recent events have shown the Belarusian 
authorities that any serious overtures to the West can be 
punished by Russia, by means of Moscow’s enormous 
economic and, even more importantly, propaganda leverage. 
There have already been signs that Russia is renewing the 
anti-Lukashenka campaign with which it toyed in 2010 in 
order to close off that year’s putative “opening” to the West. 
Former Kremlin confidant Gleb Pavlovsky even predicts 
that Lukashenka’s recent displays of independence will 
earn him the same type of anti-“fascist” propaganda that 
Russia deployed against Ukraine.21 So, Minsk is wary both 
of Russian pressure and of the consequences of building up 
its defences against that pressure.
Lukashenka dislikes Russia’s increasingly aggressive 
stance in the region, but he was also shocked by the 
internal destabilisation that led to the fall of Viktor 
Yanukovych’s regime in Ukraine. He hopes to crush any 
internal dissent that Russia could exploit to increase its 
leverage, but in the current circumstances, it is unlikely 
that he will need to resort to the kind of mass repression 
seen in 2010. Very few, even among the most optimistic in 
the Belarusian opposition, believe that the 2015 election 
will be a game changer. With attention elsewhere, there 
is unlikely to be much fuss in the West if the election is 
again fraudulent. Mass protest and state violence would 
be another matter, but, at the moment, the opposition 
is quiescent insofar as it accepts the argument in favour 
of closing ranks while national security is potentially 
under threat from Russia. One major opposition party, 
the Belarusian Popular Front, has already spoken out 
against any “Maidan scenario” in Belarus (that is, mass 
20   “A Little Further From Russia”, Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and 
Political Studies, 6 January 2015, available at http://www.iiseps.org/analitica/821/lang/
en.
21   Grigory Ioffe, “Reasserting Belarus’s Independent Voice”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
23 January 2015, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=43446&cHash=fc919947b933bd06b24328eb0a1dfddc.
protests) and has called instead for consolidating the idea 
of Belarusian independence among the population.22 
Longer-term trends, however, are likely to undermine the 
status quo. Growth is low, so the Belarusian economic and 
social system is steadily losing the relative advantage it had 
over Russia and Ukraine. Opinion polls also show a growing 
generation gap. In a survey undertaken by the Independent 
Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies in March 
2014, after Yanukovych’s flight from Ukraine, a majority 
of those aged over 45 (51 percent) thought that Belarus 
was “headed in the right direction”. But the majority of 
those under 45 thought it was not (55 percent, with only 
30 percent saying it was headed in the right direction). The 
status quo was supported by 51 percent of over-45s, but by 
only 22 percent of under-45s, meaning the vast majority of 
the younger group wanted “change”. Sixty percent of the 
older group trusted Lukashenka, but only 32 percent of the 
under-45s trusted the president.23 
The economy is facing another downturn in 2015. Russian 
subsidies are falling because of the parlous state of the Russian 
economy. Belarus has been forced to pay back export duties 
on oil products to Russia (after refining oil from Russia), 
amounting to 5-6 percent of GDP.24 Although Belarus made 
some short-term profits by channelling food products that 
were on the EU sanctions list to Russia, GDP growth was 
only 0.9 percent in 2013 and 1.6 percent in 2014. The forecast 
for 2015 is much the same. The political-economic “business 
cycle” is not in fact cyclical. The Belarusian economy will not 
recover unless Russian subsidies start flowing more freely 
again. Moreover, Russia’s economic climate has a direct 
impact on Belarus’s economy: Russia remains the destination 
of 33 percent of Belarus’s exports and subsidiaries of Russian 
banks account for a quarter of banking sector assets in 
Belarus. Moreover, 70 percent of foreign direct investment 
in Belarus comes from Russia; a substantial decline in these 
flows could further hurt the Belarusian economy.25 
22   “BPF is Calling to Drop the Maidan Idea and Nominate Kastusiou for Presidency” 
(“БНФ предлагает отказаться от Площади и выдвинуть в президенты Костусева”), 
Tut.by, 7 March 2015, available at http://news.tut.by/politics/438685.html.
23   Results of the Nation [sic] Opinion Poll March 2014’, IISEPS, available at http://
iiseps.org/dannye/45.
24   IMF, “Republic of Belarus”.
25   Ibid.
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7There is no conclusive evidence that increasing the level 
of sanctions reduces the number of political prisoners. 
Discussions about how the situation would have evolved 
had there been no sanctions is purely theoretical as so 
many other factors, both internal and external, come into 
play. However, analysis of the number of political prisoners 
based on Amnesty International reports suggests a trend 
pointing to factors outside the EU’s control. As Figure 3 
below shows, the authorities increase their repression (as 
evidenced by the number of political prisoners) at times of 
presidential elections but decrease it in response to more 
aggressive behaviour by Russia in the region. This was the 
case with the Russian war in Georgia in 2008 – Amnesty 
International did not report any long-term political 
prisoners remaining in custody at the end of 2008. Of all 
political prisoners listed by Amnesty International Report 
for 2014/2015 only one (former presidential candidate 
Mikalai Statkevich) still remains behind bars almost a 
year after the crisis in Ukraine. In other words, pressure 
from Russia makes Belarus more mindful of increasing its 
options in the West.
The EU’s three misconceptions 
The EU sanctions policy highlights the fact that, over the 
last decade and a half, the EU has focused almost exclusively 
on the areas in which Belarus has fallen short of European 
standards, often showing little interest in discussing 
anything other than human rights and democracy. The EU 
expects Belarus to have the same aspirations as most other 
European countries, including a shift to a market economy, 
democracy, and the rule of law. At the same time, it applies 
a different yardstick to Belarus than to other former Soviet 
Union countries such as Russia or Azerbaijan. The EU’s 
approach to Belarus, which so far resulted in frustration and 
lack of progress is based on several misconceptions.
The first misconception relates to the implicit assumption 
that, simply because of geography, Belarusians will 
understand and share European values and will want 
to join the EU. In reality, both Russian and domestic 
propaganda often discredits European values and shows 
Europe to the Belarusian population in a very negative 
light. Lack of open public debate and limited access to 
uncensored information serve to weaken public demand 
for integration with the EU. At the same time, Belarusians 
are not inherently pro-Russian, as discussed above. Public 
opinion shifts between a preference for Russia and the EU, 
depending on which direction seems more feasible at the 
time. Underlying existential loyalties are not all-powerful. 
They are trumped by propaganda efforts and a mentality of 
patronage: who can provide the most benefits? 
A second misconception is that regime change in Belarus 
will inevitably lead to a pro-Western government in 
Minsk, based on the equally questionable assumption that 
Lukashenka is somehow as Russophile as it is possible to 
be. Even if regime change did take place in Belarus, in the 
current circumstances it would not necessarily produce a 
pro-Western regime, given the influence of Russia in the 
The country faces a liquidity crisis, with needs estimated 
at over $4 billion. Minsk hopes that the International 
Monetary Fund will provide a short-term financial injection, 
but Russia is likely to be a better bet. Minsk does not want 
to be entirely dependent on Russia – it aspires to be more 
of a Switzerland or a Singapore – but it would like to obtain 
funds on its own terms. Any role for the West in short-term 
financing, therefore, is likely to be indirect.
The sanctions paradox
After 20 years of Lukashenka in power and ten years of EU 
sanctions against Belarus, many in the West admit that the 
Western policy to democratise Belarus has largely failed. 
The human rights situation in Belarus has deteriorated since 
1994, although there have been many ups and downs. When 
several prominent opposition figures disappeared without 
trace in 1999-2000, the EU began to introduce targeted 
sanctions. Western politicians persuaded themselves that 
the solution to the Belarus problem was the release of 
political prisoners and, ideally, free and fair elections. 
The EU blacklist grew from six individuals in 2004 to 
over 250 in 2014. (Figure 2 illustrates the distribution 
of blacklisted individuals by sector.) The expansion of 
sanctions clearly correlates with and follows on from the 
rise in the number of political prisoners. However, there 
is a much weaker correlation between the reduction of the 
number of political prisoners (now in single digits) and the 
number of blacklisted individuals (still over 200).26 
It was relatively easy to impose sanctions because Belarus 
was small and unimportant and was not integrated into 
European structures.27 But the irony of sanctions is that 
the more pressure they put on the economic and political 
system created by Lukashenka, the more they undermined 
the EU’s leverage in Belarus. Economic sanctions and 
political isolation have pushed Belarus even further into 
Russia’s embrace. By making the Belarusian economy 
more dependent upon Russian subsidies, sanctions hamper 
business initiatives, divert foreign investors, and make 
people even more dependent upon the state. Unable to 
travel to Europe, Belarusian officials have to cooperate more 
intensively with Russia, learning how to run the country 
from Moscow’s representatives. International isolation also 
undermines other areas such as higher education, freedom 
of movement, and the activities of civil society. 
Belarus and Russia gain political dividends when sanctions 
are imposed that hurt the other. Russian sanctions against 
European food producers benefited Belarus, which is now 
a large re-exporter of those products to Russia. And when 
the EU introduces sanctions against Belarus, they help 
the Kremlin by pushing the Belarusian economy and its 
bureaucracy closer to Russia. 
For the moment, sanctions do not seem to have succeeded 
in changing the Belarusian administration’s behaviour. 
26   Data: own computations. Amnesty International on the number of political prisoners, 
European Union Regulations and Decisions.
27   Yaraslau Kryvoi, “Why European Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work”, Minnesota 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, p. 209, 2008.
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Belarusian economic, political, and media space. Moreover, 
if Russia could get away with military intervention in 
Georgia and could annex a part of Ukraine, it would not 
hesitate from interfering in Belarus’s internal affairs, 
including by using military force if that should prove 
necessary. The threat of greater Belarusian independence 
could well push Russia to manufacture a conflict as an 
excuse to intervene. It is important, therefore, to find ways 
to cooperate at every level with those who are currently 
in charge of Belarus, to implement reforms in important 
areas such as economy, the rule of law, and education. 
That would create a more solid and utilitarian demand 
for democracy compared to the unrealistic scenario of 
revolutionary regime change.
Finally, many Western politicians have fallen victim to 
the image of Belarus as Europe’s North Korea, an isolated 
dictatorship in which it is completely impossible to 
achieve anything.28  This is counterproductive and untrue. 
Nearly every major Western donor, including USAID and 
the EU, runs projects in Belarus, even if they operate 
under signifcant restrictions. Using demonising clichés to 
describe the situation in Belarus actually hurts local civil 
society, especially when EU and US officials talk of civil 
society’s primary role being to promote radical political 
change in Minsk. The threat of revolution has had a 
strong psychological effect on the Belarusian authorities, 
especially since they believe that all of the so-called colour 
revolutions were initiated and organised by the West. 
As a result, it has become extremely difficult to mount 
meaningful efforts to influence the situation in Belarus 
from within.
28    See, for example, Rick Westhead, “Belarus: ‘The North Korea of Europe’”, Toronto 
Star, 7 January 2012, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/01/07/
belarus_the_north_korea_of_europe.html.
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Political prisoners and major political events
Policy recommendations
Belarus is under growing pressure and is considering its 
options. Despite some changes in rhetoric, Belarus is not 
adjusting its foreign policy because it wants to change itself. 
Instead, Lukashenka wants to preserve his system from 
Russian pressure. But recent moves to strengthen Belarusian 
sovereignty and nationhood risk undermining his traditional 
method of balancing between the West and Russia. 
Lukashenka’s current overtures to the West differ from those 
he made in the previous period of tentative engagement in 
2009-2010. That engagement ultimately failed because of 
the uneasy balance within a twin-track policy, with Belarus 
seeking foreign policy insurance against Russia by making 
token moves towards softening authoritarianism. This 
time, the second track is different. If the West seeks to 
engage, it will be by supporting Belarusian statehood, not by 
encouraging a putative domestic mini-liberalisation.  
The EU has two ways to respond, either based on geopolitics 
and concern about Russia, or based in an effort to strengthen 
Belarusian society in the longer term. Both would drop the 
conditionality approach of “more for more” in all but name. 
The EU would confine itself to supporting Lukashenka’s 
policy of adjustment towards Russia, but without expecting 
fundamental change inside Belarus, and without taking 
steps that might make relations with Russia even worse. 
The outlines of a geopolitical or realpolitik approach were 
sketched by Latvia’s State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Andrejs Pildegovičs after Latvia assumed the EU presidency 
in January 2015. Minsk, he claimed, had helped to de-
escalate the Ukraine crisis, which gave it some leverage 
for “openings on behalf of the EU”.29 He proposed that the 
29   “Latvia Claims Its Presidency Won't Be ‘Anti-Russian’”, EurActiv, 8 January 2015, 
available at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/latvia-claims-its-
presidency wont-be-anti-russian-311106.
9accessible by means of increased and more effective trans-
border TV, FM radio, and internet broadcasting would lead 
to more demand for democratic change. At the same time, 
Belarusians should be given better access to information 
about the EU, its history and values. Although the EU has a 
Representative Office in Minsk, much more should be done 
to promote the EU at universities (for example, by organising 
public lectures, exchanges, and essay competitions) or for 
the wider public through civil society organisations. The EU 
needs to continue supporting Belsat TV, which is based in 
Poland, but it also needs to go beyond that and empower 
local voices from within.
In the past, the West has focused on educating human rights 
and opposition political activists about the EU and its values. 
But the Belarusian bureaucracy, the most influential group 
in Belarusian society, has much less understanding of the 
EU; it mainly gets its information from Russia-dominated 
media. Brussels should increase its work in experience 
transfer and should intensify educational programmes for 
officials (particularly the younger ones), focusing not on 
general geopolitical contradictions but on practical technical 
regulations, standards, and procedures. By engaging officials 
at all levels in meaningful cooperation, the EU will stimulate 
appetite for reforms in Belarus. 
The EU has paid insufficient attention to the role of national 
identity in Belarus. For instance, the European Humanities 
University in Lithuania, one of the largest donor-supported 
projects, has slowly drifted from being Belarus-focused 
to catering for a larger group of Russian-speakers in the 
former Soviet space.33 However, without the development 
of a stronger national identity, Belarus could easily become 
a part of Russia, particularly after Lukashenka is gone. 
Civil society groups should be supported, but so should 
the cautious steps of the Belarusian authorities, who are 
afraid to anger the Russian nationalists now dominant in 
Russia. This support should take the form not just of moral 
encouragement but also of concrete long-term programmes. 
This is one of the areas in which the interests of the 
Belarusian authorities, civil society, and the EU coincide. 
Lowering the visa barrier by decreasing visa fees and making 
them free for many categories of Belarusians would also 
strengthen pro-European sentiment in wider Belarusian 
society, as would developing business and civil society 
contacts. Currently Belarus receives more Schengen visas 
per capita than any other country.34 But most of these visas 
are issued for only a few days or months, forcing Belarusians 
to submit repeatedly to expensive, tedious and sometimes 
humiliating visa procedures. The EU should issue more 
multiple-year visas for Belarusians who have a good history 
of travelling to the EU. This should become a rule rather 
than an exception.
The EU's scholarship programmes, such as the European 
Scholarship Scheme for Young Belarusians, should be 
expanded to include exchanges of PhD students and 
33   Yaraslau Kryvoi and Alastair Rabagliati, “EHU: Optimising Impact On Belarus”, 
Belarus Digest, 14 June 2013, available at http://belarusdigest.com/sites/default/files/
ehuforbelarus.pdf.
34   “Overview of Schengen Visa Statistics 2009-2012”, European Commission, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/docs/overview_of_schengen_visa_statistics_en.pdf.
EU reconsider sanctions.30 Pildegovičs asserted that there 
were only three remaining political prisoners in Belarus.31 
He also said that Latvia wants Belarus to be represented at 
the highest level at the EU’s Eastern Partnership summit in 
Riga in May 2015.32 
A Belarus that was freer to develop its relationships with the 
West would undoubtedly be of concern to Russia and absorb 
much of its time and energy. But what would come next – or 
would that in itself represent a broader security gain for the 
other countries in the region? More importantly, perhaps: 
what would such an approach actually achieve, other than a 
stronger but still authoritarian Belarus? 
A second and more productive approach would be focused on 
Belarus itself, and would renew the policy of “engagement” 
without the unrealistic hopes of 2009-2010. The EU would 
offer to assist in a more modern form of nation building, 
one that would gradually empower civil society from within. 
The possibility of fomenting a quick regime change in 
Belarus has been unlikely since at least 2006. So, instead 
of criticising the regime from the sidelines, this approach 
would aim at patiently increasing if the EU’s presence 
in Belarus. The focus should be not just on human rights, 
but more broadly on the rule on law, not so much on quick 
political changes but more on good governance and fighting 
corruption. Without a presence on the ground, the EU has 
no bargaining power. 
Such an approach would entail four main strands of EU 
activity:• The EU should help to strengthen statehood and 
national identity politics as well as to counter the 
Russian propaganda machine.• The EU should engage more across the board: in the 
first place, with civil society, which should ultimately 
create more demand for sovereignty, democracy, and 
the rule of law in Belarus, but it should also interact 
more with the bureaucracy at all levels.• Europe should provide indirect economic assistance: 
conduct a dialogue on economic modernisation and 
help with WTO membership and with expanding 
the role of the European Investment Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. • The EU should encourage stronger cooperation 
between Belarus and Ukraine, to ease Russian pressure 
on both states.
Countering Russian propaganda will be one of the most 
important tasks. The EU needs to confront aggressive anti-
Western propaganda, which comes primarily from Russian 
media outlets in Belarus. Making independent media more 
30   Tatyana Korovenkova, “EU Sanctions Against Belarus Could Be Reviewed in the First 
Half of the Year” (“Санкции ЕС в отношении Беларуси могут быть пересмотрены в 
первом полугодии”), Naviny.by, 23 January, available at 
http://naviny.by/rubrics/eu/2015/01/23/ic_articles_627_188061/. 
31   Grigory Ioffe, “Is Belarus Benefiting From a Change in the West’s Perspective?”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 28 January 2015, available at http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43463&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=85f36ebaa0ab7a2f
cc683e74acd5be95.
32   “Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs of Latvia: we would like to see the leadership 
of Belarus at the summit of the Eastern Partnership” (“Госсекретарь МИД Латвии: на 
саммите Восточного партнерства хотели бы видеть руководство Беларуси”), Tut.by, 
23 January 2015, available at http://news.tut.by/politics/432710.html.
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academics. However, it is not enough to help young people 
leave Belarus and study at Western universities. It is equally 
important to create fellowship programmes to support 
Western-qualified Belarusians in returning to their home 
country to work in education, public sector, or policy-
oriented organisations. That would address Belarus’s need 
for Western expertise and alleviate the brain-drain problem.
Although the Eastern Partnership has largely failed to reach 
its objectives on Belarus, it is important to keep Belarus 
involved even just as a formal member of this club, to 
enable it to cooperate with Ukraine and other countries 
of the region on matters of mutual interest. Clearly, the 
current Belarusian leadership remains uninterested in the 
prospect of joining the EU, which means that it has a very 
different motivation to leaders of countries such as Ukraine. 
This means a more individualised approach is needed. 
Finally, many of the problems Belarus faces are similar to 
those of Ukraine. This should lead to the encouragement 
and funding of cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine at 
all levels (state and non-state), including common research 
initiatives, grant programmes, and exchange schemes for 
academics and policymakers. 
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